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THE REASONABLENESS OF
AMORTIZATION PERIODS FOR
NONCONFORMING USES-BALANCING
THE PRIVATE INTEREST AND THE
PUBLIC WELFARE
OSBORNE M. REYNOLDS, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
Following the general rule against retroactive application of legisla-
tion, most courts hold that a zoning law is inapplicable to uses or struc-
tures already existing at the time the law goes into effect.' Often, the
legislation itself expressly provides for the exemption of such "noncon-
forming uses." 2 Even when the zoning legislation makes no specific
reference to the question of retroactivity, courts have taken the view
that nonconforming uses are exempt from the legislation's restrictions.
In the early years of zoning, this was true largely because courts
thought that the contrary view would raise serious constitutional ques-
tions. Courts also believed that nonconforming uses would disappear
* Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma. The author expresses deep
appreciation to his research assistant, Warren Fields.
1. See Annot., Validity of Provisions for Amortization of Nonconforming Uses, 22
A.L.R.3d 1134 (1968). See generally 82 AM. JUR. 2d Zoning and Planning § 178
(1976).
2. A "nonconforming use" for purposes of applying this policy is one that is in
actual and lawful existence at the time the zoning law becomes operative. Board of
Supervisors v. Miller, 170 N.W.2d 358, 361 (Iowa 1969) (quoting E. MCQuILLiN, 8A
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 25.185, at 21 (rev. ed. 1965)).
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soon after the enactment of the zoning ordinance.3 The right to a non-
conforming use exists only so long as the property owner continues the
use itself.4 Moreover, this right gives no protection to any use that is
different from that in existence when the zoning law takes effect.' The
individual property owner does not possess the right to a nonconform-
ing use. Rather, the right runs with the land and is passed to subse-
quent owners.
6
Although some commentators forecasted a rapid demise in noncon-
forming uses, their prediction has proven incorrect. One critic called
this development "one of the great disappointments of the zoning
movement."7 Indeed, the continued existence of nonconforming uses
has, in many communities, become the greatest obstacle to the orderly
development that these communities seek to achieve through zoning.
8
3. See Mandelker, Prolonging the Nonconforming Use: Judicial Restriction of the
Power to Zone in Iowa, 8 DRAKE L. REv. 23 (1958). See generally 0. REYNOLDS,
LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 387 (1982), noting four reasons for the allowance of non-
conforming uses under early zoning laws: (1) local governments considered zoning
largely a matter of prospective control, not a tool for changing existing development;
(2) early zoning authorities felt that a few nonconforming uses would not interfere with
the overall plan; (3) strong political opposition to the first zoning ordinances; and
(4) constitutional arguments against zoning would have been strengthened if noncon-
forming uses had been eliminated. On the history of nonconforming uses, see Krause,
Nonconforming Uses in Illinois, 43 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 153 (1966); Strong, Noncon-
forming Uses: The Black Sheep of Zoning, 7 INST. ON PLAN., ZONING & EMINENT
DOMAIN 25 (1968).
4. League to Save Lake Tahoe v. Crystal Enterprises, 685 F.2d 1142, 1146 (9th Cir.
1982) (interpreting ordinance under which construction could amount to nonconform-
ing use but right to such use lost if construction ceased for period of one year). On the
manner in which the right to a nonconforming use may be lost through "abandon-
ment," see notes 15-17 infra and accompanying text.
5. See Hanna v. Board of Adjustment, 408 Pa. 306, 313-14, 183 A.2d 539, 543-44
(1962) (new building for new use, in same or higher nonconforming classification, may
not be erected).
6. Marchese v. Norristown Borough Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 2 Pa. Commw. 84,
98, 277 A.2d 176, 184 (1971); Eitnier v. Kreitz Corp., 404 Pa. 406, 412, 172 A.2d 320,
323 (1961). There is also some authority that a zoning ordinance may validly provide
for the termination of a nonconforming use upon a change in ownership. See Annot.,
Zoning: Change in Ownership of Nonconforming Business or Use as Affecting Right to
Continuance Thereof, 9 A.L.R.2d 1039 (1950).
7. Mandelker, Prolonging the Nonconforming Use: Judicial Restriction of the Power
to Zone in Iowa, 8 DRAKE L. REv. 23 (1958). See generally Norton, Elimination of
Incompatible Uses & Structures, 20 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs. 305 (1955).
8. Board of Supervisors v. Miller, 170 N.W.2d 358, 361-62 (Iowa 1969) (preexisting
nonconforming uses do not dissipate of their own accord, so municipalities have the
authority, through their police power, to require termination of nonconforming uses
after reasonable amortization period). See Note, Termination of Nonconforming Uses-
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Some commentators have blamed nonconforming uses for limiting the
effectiveness of land use controls9 and for contributing to urban blight
in some areas.' 0 Originally, attacks on nonconforming uses mainly
took the form of limitations on growth or repair.1 Thus, courts gener-
ally denied property owners the right to expand a nonconforming
use. 2 Prohibiting substantial alterations,13 courts allowed only routine
Harbison to the Present, 14 SYRACUSE L. REv. 62 (1962). See generally Graham, Leg-
islative Techniques for the Amortization of the Nonconforming Use: A Suggested
Formula, 12 WAYNE L. REv. 435 (1966) ("Such incompatible uses often result in in-
conveniences and undesirable circumstances such as increased and noisier traffic, un-
pleasant odors, polluted air and water, increased noise generally, diminished aesthetic
appearance, and decreases in property values.").
9. See MESSER, NON-CONFORMING USES, MUNICIPALITIES AND THE LAW IN Ac-
TION 374 (1951).
10. See Anderson, Amortization of Nonconforming Uses--A Preliminary Appraisal
of Harbison v. City of Buffalo, 10 SYRACUSE L. REV. 44 n.5 (1958) (citing Guandolo,
Housing Codes in Urban Renewal, 25 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1 (1956)).
11. See Note, Termination of Nonconforming Uses--Harbison to the Present, 14
SYRACUSE L. REV. 62 (1962).
12. See Dienelt v. Monterey County, 113 Cal. App. 2d 128, 131, 247 P.2d 925, 926
(1952) (resort located in residential zone not allowed to expand); Mercer Lumber Co. v.
Village of Glencoe, 390 Ill. 138, 144, 60 N.E.2d 913, 916 (1945) (zoning ordinance
restricting expansion of lumber yard to 30% of its current capacity presumptively
valid); Seekonk v. Anthony, 339 Mass. 49, 55, 157 N.E.2d 651, 655 (1959) (enlargement
of plant from gravel processing to cement manufacturing violated zoning ordinance);
Pisicchio v. Board of Appeals, 165 Misc. 156, 157, 300 N.Y.S. 368, 370 (1937) (coal
yard's increase of coal sale volume extended a nonconforming use contrary to zoning
ordinance); State ex reL Miller v. Cain, 40 Wash. 2d 216, 242 P.2d 505 (1952) (denial of
building permit to expand service station was valid exercise of police power). Cf. State
ex reL City Ice & Fuel Co. v. Stegner, 120 Ohio St. 418, 425, 166 N.E. 226, 228 (1929)
(proper to deny permit for manufacturing ice where premises previously used only for
storage). But see Jahnigen v. Staley, 245 Md. 130, 138, 225 A.2d 277, 282 (1967) (pier
owner could increase number of boats rented from dock; increase in volume was a mere
intensification, rather than an expansion, of a nonconforming use). See generally, Note,
Municipal Corporations-Police Power and Regulations---Whether or Not Provision in
Zoning, Ordinance Restricting Extension of Nonconforming Use Is Arbitrary and Unrea-
sonable, 23 CHI-KENT L. REV. 349 (1945); Annot., Construction of New Building or
Structure on Premises Devoted to Nonconforming Use as Violation of Zoning Ordinance,
10 A.L.R.4th 1122 (1981). There is some authority, chiefly in Pennsylvania, allowing
expansion of a nonconforming use if such expansion is in response to normal growth of
a business. See Jackson v. Pottstown Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 426 Pa. 534, 233 A.2d
252 (1967).
13. See Earle v. Shackleford, 177 Ark. 291, 293, 6 S.W.2d 294, 295 (1928) (struc-
tural alterations forbidden); Selligman v. Von Allmen Bros., Inc., 297 Ky. 121, 126, 179
S.W.2d 207, 210 (1944). On what alterations amount to a sufficiently great structural
change that they will be forbidden, see Pross v. Excelsior Cleaning & Dyeing Co., 110
Misc. 195, 179 N.Y.S. 176 (1919) (consideration given whether the change affects a vital
and substantial portion of the premises, whether it alters appearance of the use, whether
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repair and maintenance. 14 Furthermore, once the property owner
abandons the use, he is unable to resume it." Courts upheld abandon-
ment only upon a showing of intent to abandon,1 6 as exhibited by some
it is extraordinary in scope or unusual in amount of expenditure, etc.). See generally
Young, Regulation and Removal of Nonconforming Uses, 12 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 681
(1961); Annot., Validity and Construction of Zoning or Building Ordinance Prohibiting
or Regulating Subsequent Alteration, Addition, Extension, or Substitution of Existing
Buildings, 64 A.L.R. 920 (1929).
14. See City of Madison Heights v. Manto, 359 Mich. 244, 249-50, 102 N.W.2d
182, 185 (1960) (repair of trailer park's septic tank and sewer system was not an en-
largement, but routine maintenance, permissible under zoning ordinances); Horwitz v.
Dearborn Township, 332 Mich. 623, 52 N.W.2d 235 (1952) (aluminum covering could
be used to replace canvas); Zoning Bd. v. Lawrence, 309 S.W.2d 883 (Tex. Civ. App.
.1958) (moving one part of veterinary clinic 150 feet to attach to another building not a
structural alteration). See generally Babcock, What Should and Can be Done with Non-
conforming Uses, 1972 INsT. ON PLAN., ZONING & EMINENT DOMAIN 23; Annot.,
Zoning: Changes, Repairs, or Replacements in Continuation of Nonconforming Use, 87
A.L.R.2d 4 (1963). Some zoning ordinances forbid extensive repairs. See Fratcher,
Constitutional Law: Zoning Ordinances Prohibiting Repair of Existing Structures, 35
MICH. L. Rnv. 642 (1937).
15. See Grushkin v. Zoning Bd., 26 Conn. Supp. 457, 227 A.2d 98 (1967) (although
building in residential zone was never abandoned as a business site, liquor license would
substantially change nature of business, and therefore denial of license was proper to
prevent expansion of nonconforming use); City of Las Cruces v. Neff, 65 N.M. 414, 338
P.2d 731 (1959) (temporary suspension of use of nonconforming advertising sign after
sign blew down did not constitute an abandonment; therefore, repairing sign did not
violate ordinance). See generally Annot., Zoning: Right to Resume Nonconforming Use
of Premises After Voluntary or Unexplained Break in the Continuity of Nonconforming
Use, 57 A.L.R.3d 279 (1974).
16. Auditorium, Inc. v. City of Wilmington, 47 Del. 373, 91 A.2d 528 (1952) (aban-
donment not found from mere discontinuance of activity); Paul v. Selectmen of Scitu-
ate, 301 Mass. 365, 370, 17 N.E.2d 193, 196 (1938) (abandonment is a question of law;
mere nonuse of a building for its nonconforming use for a period of time insufficient to
show abandonment); City of Binghamton v. Gartell, 275 A.D. 457, 90 N.Y.S.2d 556
(1949) (little activity in junk business for four years, but no abandonment). Ordinances
sometimes indicate that nonuse for a prescribed period is determinative of abandon-
ment, and courts have held that such provisions remove the need for a showing of intent
ifthe legislation makes such removal clear. See Franmor Realty Corp. v. LeBoeuf, 201
Misc. 220, 104 N.Y.S.2d 247 (1951), aff'd, 279 A.D. 795, 109 N.Y.S.2d 525, appeal
denied, 279 A.D. 874, 110 N.Y.S.2d 910 (1952) (zoning ordinance which prohibited
resumption of nonconforming use if use discontinued more than 12 months held valid,
regardless of reason for discontinuance); State ex rel Peterson v. Burt, 42 Wis. 2d 284,
166 N.W.2d 207 (1969) (municipality not required to prove intent to abandon when
ordinance provided that one-year discontinuation of use effected an abandonment).
Similarly, ordinances that forbid resumption after a designated period of discontinuance
remove the need for a showing of intent to abandon. See Wilson v. Edgar, 64 Cal. App.
654, 222 P. 623 (1923) (ordinance prohibited use of building for nonconforming busi-
ness other than business engaged in at time of passage of ordinance; closing of milk
bottling business effected an abandonment, so that cloth dyeing business could not be
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voluntary act.
17
conducted in building after milk bottling business shut down); State ex rel Brill v.
Mortenson, 6 Wis. 2d 325, 96 N.W.2d 603 (1959) (ordinance providing for termination
of nonconforming use after 12-month cessation of business does not permit substitution
of a new nonconforming use after original nonconforming use is discontinued). Some
ordinances prohibit an owner from resuming a nonconforming use or regard a use as
abandoned after a prescribed period of nonuse. In those situations, courts will find
abandonment only if the legislators establish the owner's intent to abandon and rule
that otherwise the owner may resume the use. See Smith v. Howard, 407 S.W.2d 139
(Ky. 1966) (intent to abandon required, or such lack of diligence as to amount to aban-
donment); Dusdal v. City of Warren, 387 Mich. 354, 196 N.W.2d 778 (1972). If the
premises are used for a purpose that conforms to the zoning law, the same rules are
applied as where the property is not used at all. A temporary change, absent intent to
abandon the nonconforming purpose, will not work an abandonment. State ex rel.
Morehouse v. Hunt, 235 Wis. 358, 291 N.W. 745 (1940) (temporary use of a noncon-
forming structure as a conforming structure, with intent to return to nonconforming
use, is insufficient to show abandonment). But a lengthy period of use for a conforming
purpose is strong evidence of abandonment. See Branch v. Powers, 210 Ark. 836, 197
S.W.2d 928 (1946) (use of nonconforming structure for storage, a conforming purpose,
for 11 years constituted abandonment of nonconforming use). A change from one non-
conforming use to another is ordinarily not allowed and can also result in a finding of
abandonment. See Town of Montclair v. Bryan, 16 N.J. Super. 535, 85 A.2d 231 (1951)
(change of use from nonconforming multiple family dwelling to conforming single fam-
ily home was fatal to nonconforming use). Some ordinances, however, allow a change
in the direction of conformity. See D. HAGMAN, J. LARSON & C. MARTIN, CALIFOR-
NIA ZONING PRACTICE § 9.22 (1969).
17. See Green v. Copeland, 286 Ala. 341, 239 So. 2d 770, 56 A.L.R.3d 134 (1970)
(suspension of beer license not sufficient to show abandonment of nonconforming use;
rather, some voluntary act necessary to show abandonment); Empire City Racing Ass'n
v. City of Yonkers, 132 Misc. 816, 230 N.Y.S. 457 (1928) (destruction of nonconform-
ing structure by fire insufficient to show abandonment; property owner may lawfully
erect nonconforming structures to replace those which had burned down); Rowton v.
Alagood, 250 S.W.2d 264 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952) (nonconforming use not abandoned
when building inspector denied permit to occupy the building for commercial pur-
poses). Thus, in the absence of legislation to the contrary, a temporary discontinuance
due to fire, act of God, or governmental activities will not effect an abandonment. See
Annot., Zoning: Right to Repair or Reconstruct Building Operating as Nonconforming
Use, After Damage or Destruction by FRre or Other Casualty, 57 A.L.R.3d 419 (1974);
Annot., Zoning: Right to Resume Nonconforming Use of Premises After Involuntary
Break in the Continuity of Nonconforming Use Caused by Governmental Activity, 56
A.L.R.3d 138 (1974); Annot., Zoning: Right to Resume Nonconforming Use of Premises
After Involuntary Break in the Continuity of Nonconforming Use Caused by Difficulties
Unrelated to Governmental Activity, 56 A.L.R.3d 14 (1974). But legislation providing
that a nonconforming use may not be resumed or rebuilt if destroyed, even without fault
or voluntary act of the owner, is frequently encountered and has been upheld. See
D'Agostino v. Jaguar Realty Co., 22 N.J. Super. 74, 91 A.2d 500 (1952) (total destruc-
tion); State ex reL Covenant Harbor Bible Camp v. Steinke, 7 Wis. 2d 275, 96 N.W.2d
356 (1959) (substantial destruction). But cf First English Evangelical Lutheran Church
v. County of Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987), regarding an ordinance forbidding the
construction or reconstruction of any structures in a flood protection area and holding
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Increasingly, however, courts and commentators have recognized
that the law should go beyond the limitations described and should
instead encourage the gradual elimination of nonconforming uses. 18 In
accord with this policy, zoning legislation today often provides for the
termination of these uses-most frequently through the process known
as "amortization."' 9 An amortization scheme requires the noncon-
forming use to cease at the end of a definite period of time.2" Support-
ers of this method have generally agreed that "constitutional
limitations, or considerations of fairness require that existing uses be
allowed to continue until the user has had a reasonable opportunity to
amortize his investment."
2 1
The purpose of this Article is to consider the validity of amortization
for terminating nonconforming uses and to determine how to decide
what amounts to a "reasonable" period of time for amortization.
II. VALIDITY OF AMORTIZATION LAWS
The traditional rule is that a zoning law that requires the immediate
cessation of a nonconforming use is unreasonable and is an unconstitu-
that if the ordinance denied the owner all use of his property, the ordinance was invalid
as a police-power restriction and compensation must then be paid the owner for the
time this excessive regulation was in effect. Some laws provide that the use may not be
resumed or rebuilt if destroyed to the extent of a stated percentage of its former value.
See Moffatt v. Forrest City, 234 Ark. 12, 350 S.W.2d 327 (1961) (if destroyed to extent
of 60% of value); Bobandal Realties, Inc. v. Worthington, 21 A.D.2d 784, 250 N.Y.S.2d
575 (1964) (50% of value), aff'd 15 N.Y.2d 788, 205 N.E.2d 685, 257 N.Y.S.2d 588
(1965).
18. See Attorney General v. Johnson, 355 S.W.2d 305 (Ky. 1962) (policy and spirit
of law of the state ordains gradual elimination of nonconforming uses, and general in-
tent of ordinance on nonconforming uses is to hold them within strict limits). Cf Wil-
son v. Edgar, 64 Cal. App. 654, 222 P. 623 (1923) (ultimate purpose of legislation is
elimination of nonconforming uses; therefore, one such use should not be allowed to
succeed another).
19. See Annot., Validity of Provisions for Amortization of Nonconforming Uses, 22
A.L.R.3d 1134, 1138 (1968), also listing five other methods of attempting to eliminate
nonconforming uses: (1) condemnation through eminent domain; (2) the use of nui-
sance law; (3) forbidding the resumption of the use after abandonment, or after a pre-
scribed period of time; (4) prohibiting or limiting expansion and/or repairs; and
(5) offering inducements to move.
20. Graham, Legislative Techniques for the Amortization of the Nonconforming Use:
A Suggested Formula, 12 WAYNE L. REv. 435, 442 (1966) [hereinafter Graham, Legis-
lative Techniques].
21. Anderson, The Nonconforming Use-A Product of Euclidean Zoning, 10 SYRA-
CUSE L. REV. 214, 237 (1959).
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tional taking of property without compensation.2 2 A number of courts
have reached the same conclusion when the zoning law provides an
amortization period after which the use must terminate.2 3 Some cases
overlook any distinction between immediate cessation and cessation af-
ter a grace period.2 4
Other authority has relied on a lack of legislative authorization. For
instance, in De Mull v. City of Lowell,2 5 a Michigan court noted that
the state legislature had expressly permitted ordinances providing for
resumption, reconstruction, extension or substitution of nonconform-
ing uses, but had refrained from authorizing ordinances providing for
their destruction.2 6 The court reasoned that the legislature intended to
withhold permission to order nonconforming uses destroyed, through a
time limitation or otherwise. Similarly, the court in United Advertising
Corporation v. Borough of Raritan,27 a New Jersey case, relied on a
state statute allowing nonconforming uses to continue despite passage
of an ordinance prospectively outlawing them. The court held that a
municipality lacked the power to limit by zoning ordinance the express
statutory right to continue such uses indefinitely. Hoffman v.
Kinealy,2" a Missouri case, invalidated an amortization provision. The
22. Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 211 Cal. 304,295 P. 14 (1930); Standard Oil Co. v.
City of Bowling Green, 244 Ky. 362, 50 S.W.2d 960 (1932); Amereilm v. Kotras, 194
Md. 591, 71 A.2d 865 (1950); Des Jardin v. Town of Greenfield, 262 Wis. 43, 53
N.W.2d 784 (1952). See Grant v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 212 Md. 301,
129 A.2d 363 (1957).
23 See De Mull v. City of Lowell, 368 Mich. 242, 118 N.W.2d 232 (1962); Hoff-
mann v. Kinealy, 389 S.W.2d 745 (Mo. 1965) (review of many cases); United Advertis-
ing Corp. v. Borough of Raritan, 11 N.J. 144, 93 A.2d 362 (1952); Town of Somers v.
Camarco, 308 N.Y. 537, 127 N.E,2d 327, reh'g denied, 309 N.Y. 772, 128 N.E.2d 813
(1955); City of Akron v. Chapman, 160 Ohio St. 382, 52 Ohio Ops. 242, 116 N.E.2d 697
(1953), criticized in 67 HAtv. L. REV. 1283 (1954); Concord Township v. Cornogg, 9
Pa. D. & C.2d 79 (Del. Co. 1956); James v. City of Greenville, 227 S.C. 565, 88 S.E.2d
661 (1955); City of Corpus Christi v. Allen, 152 Tex. 137, 254 S.W.2d 759 (1953).
24. See Town of Greenburgh v. General Outdoor Advertising Co., 109 N.Y.S.2d
826 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1951); James v. City of Greenville, supra note 23.
25. 368 Mich. 242, 118 N.W.2d 232 (1962) (Michigan municipalities had no author-
ity to terminate nonconforming uses after set period of time).
26. Id.
27. 11 N.J. 144, 93 A.2d 362 (1952). The court failed to address the issue of the
constitutionality of an amortization ordinance if the legislature delegated the power to
pass such an ordinance to municipalities. On the amendment subsequently proposed to
the state's zoning enabling legislation, see C. HAAR, LAND-UsE PLANNING 347 (3d ed.
1977).
28. 389 S.W.2d 745 (Mo. 1965). Commentators criticized this case as incorrectly
distinguishing between an exercise of police power, such as the attempt here presented
Washington University Open Scholarship
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court commented that a taking of private property without compensa-
tion by the government cannot be justified merely because the property
is not too valuable or because the taking does not occur too soon.
The Ohio courts have ruled that amortization provisions are uncon-
stitutional takings of property without just compensation.29 Several
courts have held that an owner of property used for a lawful purpose
prior to enactment of the zoning ordinance has acquired a vested right
to continue that use.30 A contrary conclusion would be unfair to an
owner who, in reliance on the prior zoning law, made substantial ex-
penditures to improve his property. Furthermore, such a result would
discourage owners from improving their property.31 Although one
Ohio decision recognized that most modem authority is to the con-
trary, that decision still followed the traditional rule. Aristo-Craft v.
Village ofEvendale32 prevented legislative interference which could re-
sult in the destruction of value absent a showing of nuisance or other
special circumstances.33
Iowa courts have long permitted the indefinite prolongation cf a
nonconforming use.34 Additionally, Iowa courts have approved em-
ployment of the amending process to validate such a use.35 Extending
to reconcile neighborhood land uses or prevent imposition of harm on neighbors, and
use of the taking power of eminent domain, such as when the public acquires some
property or rights. D. HAGMAN & J. JUERGENSMEYER, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND
DEVELOPMENT LAW 126-27 (2d ed. 1986) (citing Standard Oil Co. v. City of Tallahas-
see, 183 F.2d 410 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 340 U.S. 892 (1950)) (termination of a gasoline
station after an amortization period of ten years was upheld in support of the use of the
police power to terminate a nonconforming use).
29. The Constitution prohibits the taking of property without just compensation.
U.S. CoNsT., amend. V. See Note, Amortization: A Means of Eliminating the Noncon-
forming Use in Ohio, 19 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 1042 (1968).
30. City of Akron v. Chapman, 160 Ohio St. 382, 52 Ohio Ops. 242, 116 N.E.2d
697 (1953); Clifton Hills Realty Co. v. City of Cincinnati, 60 Ohio App. 443, 21 N.E.2d
993 (1938).
31. See Gibson v. City of Oberlin, 171 Ohio St. 1, 167 N.E.2d 651 (1960) (amortiza-
tion law held retroactive and unconstitutional); Kessler v. Smith, 104 Ohio App. 213,
142 N.E.2d 231 (1957) (amortization provision held confiscatory).
32. 69 Ohio Ops. 2d 118, 322 N.E.2d 309 (1974).
33. Id. (unless it causes a nuisance, nonconforming use cannot be constitutionally
terminated by municipal ordinance).
34. See Granger v. Board of Adjustment of City of Des Moines, 241 Iowa 1356, 44
N.W.2d 399 (1950) (municipality's power to restrict property use via zoning laws to be
strictly construed; municipality cannot gradually extinguish nonconforming use by de-
nying property owner right to repair property).
35. Keller v. City of Council Bluffs, 246 Iowa 202, 66 N.W.2d 113 (1954) (zoning is
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol34/iss1/4
1988] AMORTIZATION PERIODS FOR NONCONFORMING USES 107
the reasoning of those rulings, an Iowa court invalidated an amortiza-
tion ordinance that allowed the forced removal of nonconforming bill-
boards after two years."6 The court reasoned that although billboards
could in the future be prohibited in residential zones of a city in the
interests of safety, morality, health and decency, the owners of lawfully
erected existing billboards had vested property rights which could not
be terminated without compensation.37 Similarly, a New York court
concluded that a zoning law enacted subsequent to the establishment of
a nonconforming use which involved a substantial investment or an
established business could not terminate such use.3"
The cases that reject the possibility of amortization are in the minor-
ity. It is true that statutes sometimes expressly provide for the continu-
ation of nonconforming uses.9 Moreover, many common-law
countries regard the forced termination of nonconforming uses as pos-
sible only if the owner is compensated.' In the United States, how-
ever, courts have developed a different majority rule.
An amortization ordinance provides a period of time within which
the property owner must terminate the nonconforming use, and
thereby permits the owner to spread the loss of his present beneficial
use of the property over the specified time. Like any other ordinance,
an amortization statute is entitled to a presumption of validity, and
courts will uphold it if they find that it is a reasonable exercise of the
within legislative discretion of city council, and council's acts are presumed valid if not
arbitrary or capricious).
36. Stoner McCray Sys. v. City of Des Moines, 247 Iowa 1313, 78 N.W.2d 843
(1956) (ordinance which prohibits repair and maintenance of nonconforming use is an
unconstitutional deprivation of property without due process). See generally
Mandelker, Prolonging the Nonconforming Use: Judicial Restriction of the Power to
Zone in Iowa, 8 DRAKE L. REv. 23 (1958).
37. Stoner McCray, 247 Iowa at 1320-21, 78 N.W.2d at 848, (citing Crow v. Board
of Adjustment, 227 Iowa 324, 288 N.W. 145 (1939); Rehmann v. City of Des Moines,
200 Iowa 286, 204 N.W. 267 (1925)).
38. Town of Somers v. Camarco, 308 N.Y. 537, 127 N.E.2d 327 (1955) (owner of a
nonconforming use has a vested right in that use; use cannot be terminated unless loss
to property owner will be small). For more recent New York case law, see infra notes
57-60 and accompanying text.
39. See, e.g., Murphy, Inc. v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 147 Conn. 358, 161 A.2d
185 (1960) (though finding inapplicable in the particular case, a statute providing that
zoning regulations should not prohibit the continuance of any nonconforming use ex-
isting at the time of adoption of such regulations).
40. See D. HAGMAN, PUBLIC PLANNING AND CONTROL OF URBAN AND LAND
DEVELOPMENT 769 n. g (2d ed. 1980).
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state's police power." Of course, if no public interest is served by a
particular application of the amortization provision, courts will deem
the provision unconstitutional as applied to that property.42 A court
will almost certainly refuse to rule that an amortization ordinance is
valid regardless of the time period contained therein. 3 The owner of a
nonconforming use must at least be allowed a reasonable opportunity
to recover the original cost.' As with any exercise of the police power,
a reasonable expectation of public benefit must outweigh the harm an
amortization ordinance causes an individual.4 5 With those qualifica-
tions, most courts reject the attempt to make "a constitutional princi-
ple of the right of a preexisting use to continue to exist indefinitely. ,
46
Courts generally hold to the contrary that a great public need, such as
the need to rid an area of incompatible uses, may justify the termina-
tion of nonconforming uses without compensation. Otherwise, a
neighborhood may find itself forever with preexisting structures or en-
terprises that lower property values, interfere with orderly planning,
41. The rule is well stated in Village of Oak Park v. Gordon, 32 Ill. 2d 295, 205
N.E.2d 464 (1965) (zoning ordinance unconstitutional as applied to owner of noncon-
forming use when ordinance required owner to decrease number of boarders in his
boarding house, causing financial loss to owner, and no evidence of benefit to the public
as a result of enforcement of the ordinance). On the widespread acceptance of this rule,
see Annot., Validity of Provisionsfor Amortization of Nonconforming Uses, 22 A.L.R.3d
1134, 1139-40 (1968) (with list of authorities).
42. Village of Oak Park, 32 Ill. 2d 295, 205 N.E.2d 464.
43. See Ailes v. Decatur County Area Planning Comm'n, 448 N.E.2d 1057 (Ind.
1983), cert denied sub nom, Ripley County Area Plan. Comm'n v. Rouse, 465 U.S.
1100 (1984).
44. See National Advertising Co. v. Monterey County, 1 Cal. 3d 875, 464 P.2d 33,
83 Cal. Rptr. 577, cert. denied sub nom, National Advert. Co. v. County of Monterey,
398 U.S. 946 (1970) (removal of billboards under zoning ordinance should await expira-
tion of reasonable amortization period in order to permit billboard company to recover
original cost). Cf City of Santa Barbara v. Modern Neon Sign Co., 189 Cal. App. 2d
188, 11 Cal. Rptr. 57 (1961) (ordinance applying one-year amortization period to re-
cently installed signs held invalid); McCaslin v. City of Monterey Park, 163 Cal. App.
2d 339, 329 P.2d 522 (1958) (sixty-day amortization period invalidated as applied to
gravel pit operation); City of La Mesa v. Tweed & Gambrell Planning Mill, 146 Cal.
App. 2d 762, 304 P.2d 803 (1956) (five-year period as applied to two-year-old building
with estimated remaining economic life of twenty years held invalid).
45. See City of Corpus Christi v. Allen, 152 Tex. 137, 254 S.W.2d 759 (1953) (ordi-
nance requiring termination of four automobile salvage and wrecking yards unreasona-
ble because benefit to others would be very small).
46. D. HAGMAN & J. JUERGENSMEYER, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOP-
MENT CONTROL LAW 126 (2d ed. 1986), discussing Hoffmann v. Kinealy, 389 S.W.2d
745 (Mo. 1965).
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and prevent aesthetic regulations47 that would upgrade the area's ap-
pearance. Indeed, one scholar declared that nonconforming uses help
cause the exodus of home builders and buyers from the cities to the
newly developing suburban areas.48
In the early years of zoning, most cities found mandatory phaseout
programs as to nonconforming uses unnecessary since natural attrition
of such uses was expected and was less controversial than imposition of
a cutoff date. Frequently, however, nonconforming uses thrived due to
the protection from new competition given them by the zoning laws.
At the same time, limits on the expansion of nonconforming uses often
caused their owners to continue their operations in inadequate and
shabby quarters.49 The situation led to increased legislative adoption
of amortization provisions and to inevitable court challenges to such
provisions. Gradually, most courts held that amortization provisions
are valid if they are reasonable in nature.5° This is currently the major-
ity view in America.5
Authorities adopting the majority view often regard amortization
programs52 as the only effective means of dealing with nonconforming
uses.5" The first appellate court to approve an amortization provision
47. The prevention of aesthetic regulation is likely to occur because courts often
find aesthetic restrictions unreasonable and thus invalid as applied to areas with large
numbers of nonconforming uses. See Schropp, The Reasonableness of Aesthetic Zoning
in Florida" A Look Beyond the Police Power, 10 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 441, 457-58 (1982)
(citing Hankins v. Borough of Rockleigh, 55 N.J. Super. 132, 150 A.2d 63 (1959)).
48. Bartholomew, Non-Conforming Uses Destroy the Neighborhood, 15 J. LAND &
PUn. UTIL. ECON. 96 (1939). See also Note, Amortization and Performance Standards
in Zoning Regulations: Study of Existing Nonconforming Uses in an Indiana Commu-
nity, 30 IND. L.J. 521 (1955) (examining the problem of nonconforming uses in Bloom-
ington, Indiana).
49. See R. ELLICKSON & A.D. TARLOCK, LAND-UsE CONTROLS 196 (1981).
50. See Annot., Validity of Provisions for Amortization of Nonconforming Uses, 22
A.L.R.3d 1134, 1138-41 (1968).
51. 82 AM. JUR. 2D Zoning and Planning § 188, at 702 (1976). See generally Note,
A Suggested Means of Determining the Proper Amortization Period for Nonconforming
Structures, 27 STAN. L. REv. 1325, 1328-33 (1977) [hereinafter Note, Determining
Proper Amortization Period].
52. Amortization programs involve the determination of the useful remaining eco-
nomic life of a use and the prohibition of the use's continuation after expiration of that
time.
53. See Crolly & Norton, Termination of Nonconforming Uses, 61 ZONING BULL. 1
(June, 1952), cited in City of Los Angeles v. Gage, 127 Cal. App. 2d 442, 454-55, 274
P.2d 34, 41 (1954); Grant v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 212 Md. 301, 309, 129
A.2d 363, 366 (1957). Although the economic life of a structure is often an important
factor in the establishment of an amortization period, scholars have observed that legis-
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was the Supreme Court of Louisiana, which looked to the common law
of nuisance for precedent. The court stated that any business operated
or maintained in opposition to the general zoning for that area
amounts to a public or common nuisance.5 4 The first federal case" to
approve amortization provisions treated a municipality's power to ter-
minate an existing property use as well established, and regarded
vested property rights as clearly subject to elimination under the police
power.
After these early decisions, the use of amortization by local govern-
ments increased.5 6 In City of Los Angeles v. Gage, 7 a landmark case
on the validity of amortization laws, 8 the court relied on authorities
allowing restriction on additions or extensions to nonconforming uses.
The Gage court considered the distinction between an ordinance limit-
ing future uses and one requiring the termination of present uses to be
lation may reach a fairer result, and one more acceptable to the courts, if it emphasizes
the length of time necessary for the recovery of the original investment. See Note, De-
termining Proper Amortization Period, supra note 51, at 1335-36 and 1340-42. See infra
notes 101-130 and accompanying text.
54. State ex reL Dema Realty Co. v. McDonald, 168 La. 172, 121 So. 613 (1929),
cert denied sub nom., McDonald v. Louisiana ex rel Dema Realty Co., 280 U.S. 556
(1929) (continuing violations of a zoning ordinance which required termination of non-
conforming uses within one year constituted a nuisance; private party may bring quasi-
criminal actions for abatement of the nuisance). Accord, State ex rel Dema Realty Co.
v. Jacoby, 168 La. 752, 123 So. 314 (1929) (termination of small retail drug store after
one year). The approach taken by the Louisiana court and the outcome of the above-
cited cases is criticized in Comment, Retroactive Zoning Ordinances, 39 YALE L.J. 735
(1930). The one-year period of amortization provided by the ordinance upheld in those
cases is criticized as being too short in Note, Elimination of Nonconforming Uses, 6
CASE W. R.s. L. REv. 182, 185 (1955). In both cases a private party, not the munici-
pality, was the complaining party. In such instances, the better course is to require that
the private party establish a private nuisance, in the common-law sense, before being
allowed to compel termination of the use. Graham, Legislative Techniques, supra note
20, at 443 n.53.
55. Standard Oil Co. v. City of Tallahassee, 183 F.2d 410 (5th Cir. 1950), cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 892 (1950) (zoning ordinance which required termination of service
stations in a particular area within ten years of passage was a valid exercise of the
municipality's police power and does not unconstitutionally deprive station owners of
their property, regardless of owner's expenditures).
56. See Norton, Elimination of Incompatible Uses and Structures, 20 LAw & CON-
TEMP. PROBs. 305, 308 (1955).
57. 127 Cal. App. 2d 442,274 P.2d 34 (1954) (ordinance which required discontinu-
ance of nonconforming uses within five years not unconstitutionally arbitrary or unrea-
sonable; hardship to property owner not a material consideration when ordinance
furthers public health, safety, or welfare).
58. Graham, Legislative Techniques, supra note 20, at 443-44.
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merely one of degree. The court found that both types of ordinances
were valid exercises of the police power so long as the owner could use
the property for reasonable purposes. Noting that the owner of the use
enjoys a monopolistic position until forced to terminate, the Gage court
stated that any loss suffered is spread over a number of years. Thus,
the loss to the owner may be small when compared to the benefit to the
public.
59
Soon after the Gage decision, the New York Court of Appeals used a
similar "balancing" approach. The court ruled that a legislative body
could reasonably conclude that requiring the termination of a use, after
a period sufficient to allow a property owner to amortize his investment
and make other plans, is a valid method of solving the problem of non-
conforming uses." One commentator hailed this decision as disposing
of "the contention that nonconforming uses enjoy some sort of perpet-
ual existence, beyond the reach of the police power."' A strong dis-
sent in the case demonstrated the persistence of the view that the
owner of a preexisting use has vested property rights that a state can-
not constitutionally terminate under its police power.6 2 New York
courts, however, have applied the majority's view in subsequent
cases. 63 This position received important support from a 1962 United
States Supreme Court opinion that allowed even the immediate termi-
nation of a nonconforming use that presented a potential threat to pub-
59. City of Los Angeles v. Gage, 127 Cal. App. 2d at 460, 274 P.2d at 44. Cf.
Spurgeon v. Board of Comm'rs of Shawnee County, 181 Kan. 1008, 317 P.2d 798
(1957), upholding a two-year amortization period for a junkyard. See generally Crolly,
How to Get Rid of Nonconforming Uses, 67 AM. Crry 106, 107 (1952).
60. Harbison v. City of Buffalo, 4 N.Y.2d 553, 152 N.E.2d 42, 176 N.Y.S.2d 598
(1958) (upholding a three-year amortization period for a junkyard).
61. Anderson, Amortization of Nonconforming Uses--A Preliminary Appraisal of
Harbison v. City of Buffalo, 10 SYRACUSE L. REv. 44, 47 (1958) [hereinafter Anderson,
A Preliminary Appraisal].
62. Harbison v. City of Buffalo, 4 N.Y.2d at 564, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 606, 152 N.E.2d
at 48 (Van Voorhis, J., dissenting). In Harbison, "the margin of success was narrow,
the dimensions of approval were ambiguous, and the dissent was sharp and provoca-
tive." Anderson, A Preliminary Appraisal, supra note 61, at 45.
63. Village of Larchmont v. Sutton, 30 Misc. 2d 245, 217 N.Y.S.2d 929 (Sup. Ct.
1961) (fifteen-month amortization period as to signs upheld). Cf Town of Hempstead
v. Romano, 33 Misc. 2d 315, 226 N.Y.S.2d 291 (Sup. Ct. 1962) (although court fol-
lowed Harbison, a nonconforming use, the three-year amortization period for which had
expired twenty-eight years before the city brought an action to terminate it, was allowed
to remain). See generally Note, Termination of Nonconforming ses--Harbison to the
Present, 14 SYRACUSE L. Rav. 62 (1962).
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lic safety."
Several more recent cases expressly reject the notion that property
owners acquire a constitutionally protected right to a use that is com-
menced prior to the enactment of a zoning classification.65 In uphold-
ing amortization provisions, a court may cite the likelihood that a
nonconforming use will otherwise remain indefinitely.66 To the same
end, a court may rely on the general policy of the law encouraging the
elimination of nonconforming uses so as to promote orderly commu-
nity development.6 To justify amortization, some courts emphasize
that all property is held subject to the state's reasonable exercise of the
police power.68 Other opinions stress the presumption of validity that
64. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (court upheld an ordi-
nance prohibiting future excavations below water level and requiring existing excava-
tions below that level to be filled, despite the resulting near-exclusion of quarries from
the area; since party failed to show that the land involved in the litigation lacked other
profitable uses, court found no taking). Cf Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. City of
Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 515, 370 P.2d 342, appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 36 (1962). On
these cases, see generally Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 42-44
(1964). The ordinance involved in the Goldblatt case was not actually a zoning ordi-
nance, though similar to one in nature and effect. Moreover, the Supreme Court in
Goldblatt did not discuss the law of nonconforming uses. D. HAGMAN & J. JUERGEN-
SMEYER, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW § 4.36, at
127-28 (2d ed. 1986). When a land use restriction exceeds the police power and be-
comes a "taking" of the property, the landowner is now entitled both to invalidation of
the law and to compensation for harm suffered while the restriction was in force. First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987).
See No Taking Without Paying, TIME, June 22, 1987, at 64. As to when to draw the line
between police-power restrictions and takings, see Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
De Benedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987).
65. See Wolf v. City of Omaha, 177 Neb. 545, 129 N.W.2d 501 (1964) (ordinance
which provided for termination of nonconforming dog kennels 12 years after passage is
a valid exercise of police power and may be overturned only with clear evidence that the
ordinance is arbitrary or unreasonable); City of University Park v. Benners, 485 S.W.2d
773 (Tex), appeal dismissed sub nom., Benners v. City of University Park, 411 U.S. 901,
reh'g denied, 411 U.S. 977 (1972) (property owners have no vested right in nonconform-
ing uses; municipal ordinances which terminate such uses are within police power and
are beneficial to the public).
66. City of University Park, 485 S.W.2d at 778 n.6 (citing Note, Amortization of
Property Uses Not Conforming to Zoning Regulations, 9 U. CHI. L. REV. 477, 479
(1942)).
67. Lachapelle v. Town of Goffstown, 107 N.H. 485, 225 A.2d 624 (1967) (termina-
tion ofjunkyard within one year of effective date of ordinance unless certain conditions
met as to screening of yard).
68. See National Advertising Co. v. State ex rel. State Highway Comm'n, 91 N.M.
191, 571 P.2d 1194 (1977) (termination of advertising signs along highway).
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attaches to any zoning ordinance, even an amortization provision.69 In
some instances, the legislature has delegated to an administrative body
the task of recommending whether a nonconforming use should be ter-
minated, with final authority resting in the administrative body to or-
der termination. Courts have upheld this method so long as a
reasonable period of amortization is allowed. 0
A growing number of jurisdictions authorize counties to engage in
zoning, and therefore to validly enact amortization provisions even as
to rural areas.71 In such situations, however, a court wil often find
that the development of the area has not yet reached the point where
termination of nonconforming uses is reasonably necessary to serve the
public welfare.72
At least one court has held that amortization provisions do not re-
quire the government to compensate a property owner who is forced
either to terminate his nonconforming use or to make it comply with
the law.73 If the provision involves a reasonable exercise of the police
power, the "just compensation" requirements of eminent domain do
not apply.74 Ordinances can order the removal of nonconforming bi-
boards and other signs after a reasonable period of time, even though
69. See Village of Gurnee v. Miller, 69 IM. App. 2d 248, 215 N.E.2d 829 (1966)
(defendant found guilty of failing to terminate junkyard within required period did not
overcome presumption of ordinance's validity).
70. See People v. Gates, 41 Cal. App. 3d 590, 116 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1974) (zoning
ordinance provided that nonconforming use could be terminated by board of supervi-
sors on recommendation of planning commission within period specified in board of
supervisors' order).
71. See Spurgeon v. Board of Comm'rs of Shawnee County, 181 Kan. 1008, 317
P.2d 798 (1957) (upholding a county zoning resolution requiring that nonconforming
automobile wrecking business be terminated within two years). On the growth and
urban development occurring in many counties within metropolitan areas, see The
Boom Towns, TIME, June 15, 1987, at 14.
72. See National Advertising Co. v. County of Monterey, 211 Cal. App. 2d 375, 27
Cal. Rptr. 136 (1962) (termination of signs not allowed in areas the character and use of
which is as yet undetermined).
73. Temple Baptist Church, Inc. v. City of Albuquerque, 98 N.M. 138, 646 P.2d
565 (1982) (amortization provision did not connote a requirement of compensation, but
merely put sign owner on notice that he had certain period within which to bring his
structure into conformity).
74. Art Neon Co. v. City & County of Denver, 488 F.2d 118 (10th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 932 (1974). Compensation is required if the police power is exceeded
and a taking occurs. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles
County, 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987).
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the government pays no compensation for removal.7 5 This is true so
long as the value of the signs is either extinguished before or at the end
of the grace period. Alternatively, the nonconforming use may be re-
moved when the value of the freedom from competition assured by the
amortization ordinance for the prescribed period equals any value re-
maining in the sign at the end of the period.7 6 Furthermore, the power
of a local government to enact an amortization law may be inferred
from a grant of power to legislate for the general welfare, or from au-
thorization to create various zoning districts." A law may validly pro-
vide for termination of a nonconforming use after a reasonable period
of time, despite the continuation of such use during that time; afortiori
a law may also provide for termination after a designated, reasonable
period of disuse (or of conforming use), even if the usual requirements
for abandonment are not met.7" Thus, legislation may provide that if a
nonconforming building is allowed to remain vacant for a number of
months, the owner must thereafter use it only in conformity with the
zoning laws. Here again, the property owner need not receive compen-
sation for the termination of the nonconforming use.79
Some laws providing for the termination of nonconforming signs or
other uses authorize compensation by the government that requires the
termination. Courts will uphold such a law if it serves a public pur-
pose.80 Indeed, courts will uphold the law even if it provides for com-
pensation only in those situations when, as under some provisions
restricting signs along highways, compensation is necessary for compli-
ance with federal requirements, or where federal aid might otherwise
75. See Webster Outdoor Advertising Co. v. City of Miami, 256 So. 2d 556 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
76. Naegele Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Village of Minnetonka, 281 Minn. 492, 162
N.W.2d 206 (1968) (if value of plaintiff's property interest was extinguished before expi-
ration of three-year amortization period, there would be no taking; alternatively, if
value of freedom from competition for the statutory period equalled the value of the
property interest remaining at the end of the period, there would be just compensation
for the taking).
77. Id at 504, 162 N.W.2d at 215.
78. See State ex reL Brill v. Mortenson, 6 Wis. 2d 325, 96 N.W.2d 603 (1959).
79. State ex reL Harris v. Zoning Bd. of Appeal & Adjustment, 221 La. 941, 60 So.
2d 880 (1952).
80. See Newman Signs, Inc. v. Hjelle, 268 N.W.2d 741 (N.D. 1978), appeal dis-
missed, 440 U.S. 901 (1979) (North Dakota Highway Beautification Act entitled sign
owner to compensation for damages resulting from removal of its signs which were
lawfully erected but became nonconforming due to passage of the Act).
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be lost.8 ' Federal statutes governing nonconforming signs do not pre-
empt the power of local governments to enact stricter regulations than
the federal law provides, or to regulate signs in areas not covered by
federal provisions.8 2 Courts strictly construe provisions for compensa-
tion and apply the general rule against compensation in any situation
that fails clearly to fall within the statutory requirement, such as where
a nonconforming use is unlawfully erected.8 3
III. THE REASONABLENESS OF THE AMORTIZATION PERIOD: THE
BALANCING TEST
Amortization of nonconforming uses is widely accepted as a consti-
tutional means of removing such uses.84 When the law requires the
termination of nonconforming uses, however, courts must determine
whether the amortization period is reasonable in light of the invest-
ment involved. Thus, courts must determine what is a reasonable time
period on a case-by-case basis.8 5 Disputes necessarily center on the
81. See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 26 Cal. 3d 848, 610 P.2d 407, 164
Cal. Rptr. 510, (1980), rev'd on other grounds, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (state statute re-
quired compensation for removal of billboards only when such payment is necessary to
comply with federal law). On the federal law, see generally Lamm & Yasinow, The
Highway Beautification Act of 1965, 46 DENVER LJ. 437 (1969).
82. E.B. Elliott Advertising Co. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 425 F.2d 1141 (5th
Cir. 1970); Lamar-Orlando Outdoor Advertising v. City of Ormond Beach, 415 So. 2d
1312 (Fla. App. 1982); City of Doraville v. Turner Communications Corp., 236 Ga.
385, 223 S.E.2d 798 (1976); State v. National Advertising Co., 387 A.2d 745 (Me.
1978); Donnelly Advertising Corp. v. City of Baltimore, 279 Md. 660, 370 A.2d 1127
(1977); Ackerly Communications, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 92 Wash. 2d 905, 602 P.2d
1177 (1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 804 (1980). See City of Lake Wales v. Lamar Adver-
tising Ass'n, 339 So. 2d 981 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 414 So.
2d 1030 (Fla. 1982).
83. See LaPointe Outdoor Advertising v. Florida Dep't of Transp., 398 So. 2d 1370
(Fla. 1981) (statute governing compensation for removal of highway signs did not re-
quire compensation for unlawfully erected billboards); Hiway Ads, Inc. v. State ex reL
Dept. of Highways, 356 So. 2d 501 (La. App. 1977) (no constitutional requirement of
compensation where plaintiff had unlawfully erected signs along highways). Cf Mo-
djeska Sign Studios, Inc. v. Berle, 43 N.Y.2d 468, 373 N.E.2d 255, 402 N.Y.S.2d 359
(1977), appeal dismied, 439 U.S. 809 (1978) (by choosing to provide compensation for
billboards removed to beautify federally aided highways, legislature did not relinquish
its authority under the police power to terminate billboards without compensation).
84. See Beals v. County of Douglas, 93 Nev. 156, 560 P.2d 1373, 1374 (1977)
(amortization has received widespread acceptance as a constitutionally permissible
method of removing signs).
85. National Advertising Co. v. County of Monterey, I Cal. 3d 875, 464 P.2d 333,
83 Cal. Rptr. 577, cert. denied, 398 U.S. 946 (1970); Village of Oak Park v. Gordon, 32
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definition of a "reasonable period." It is important, therefore, to con-
sider the tests courts use to determine reasonableness. The basic test
involves balancing the public gain against the private loss.8 6 Indeed,
some commentators describe the courts as willing to consider "any cir-
cumstances bearing upon a balancing of the public gain against the
private loss."87 Generally, the relevant considerations include the na-
ture of the present use, the length of the amortization period, and the
present characteristics of, and foreseeable prospects for, development
of the area. Courts consider all of these factors only in determining the
"true issue" of whether beneficial effects on the community resulting
from discontinuance of the use will outweigh the losses to the individ-
ual landowner.88
New York courts have upheld amortization provisions as applied to
various nonconforming uses, including parking lots,89 and uses in
which the investment has been small.9" In such cases, the public bene-
fit often outweighs the private loss. Absent a showing of unreasonable
or arbitrary conduct, courts will uphold a legislative determination of
this balancing.91 Furthermore, where the legislative body has ruled the
111. 2d 295, 205 N.E.2d 464 (1965). See G. LEFCOE, LAND DEVELOPMENT LAW 924
(2d ed. 1974).
86. See Annot., Validity of Provisions for Amortization of Nonconforming Uses, 22
A.L.R.3d 1134, 1141 (1968) (citing numerous cases).
87. 82 AM. JUR. 2d Zoning and Planning § 189, at 703 (1976).
88. See Sullivan v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 83 Pa. Commw. 228, 247, 478 A.2d
912, 920 (1984).
89. People ex rel Meyer v. Kesbec, Inc., 257 A.D. 941, 13 N.Y.S.2d 104 (Sup. Ct.),
aff'd, 281 N.Y. 785, 24 N.E.2d 476 (1939), reh'g denied, 282 N.Y. 676, 26 N.E.2d 808
(1940) (owner of a parking lot had no vested right in continuation of the lot, a noncon-
forming use); People v. Wolfe, 248 A.D. 721, 290 N.Y.S. 131 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 272 N.Y.
608, 5 N.E.2d 355 (1936), reh'g denied, 273 N.Y. 498, 6 N.E.2d 422 (1937) (same).
90. New York Trap Rock Corp. v. Town of Clarkstown, 3 N.Y.2d 844, 144 N.E.2d
725, 166 N.Y.S.2d 82, appeal dismissed, 356 U.S. 582 (1957) (property owner precluded
from attaching validity of zoning ordinance which prevented him from using his land as
a rock quarry where property owner had not applied for a permit to remove rock); Rice
v. Van Vranken, 255 N.Y. 541, 175 N.E. 304 (1930) (property owner denied permit to
erect apartments when property was zoned to prohibit apartments); Fox Lane Corp. v.
Mann., 216 A.D. 813, 215 N.Y.S. 334 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd per curiam, 243 N.Y. 550, 154
N.E. 600 (1926) (when construction of planned apartment complex had not yet begun,
and property owner had made no significant expenditures, denial of building permit
because of zoning ordinance prohibiting apartment held valid). See generally Noel, Ret-
roactive Zoning and Nuisance, 41 COLUM. L. REv. 457 (1941).
91. See Grant v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 212 Md. 301, 129 A.2d 363
(1957); Suffolk Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Town of Southampton, 88 A.D.2d 601, 449
N.Y.S.2d 766 (1982), aff'd, 60 N.Y.2d 70, 455 N.E.2d 1245, 468 N.Y.S.2d 450 (1983)
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public gain to be greater than the private loss, the court will treat the
ordinance as facially valid. A property owner, however, may still chal-
lenge the constitutionality of the statute as applied in the particular
situation.
Courts will determine the validity of the statute as applied on the
basis of the specific surrounding circumstances. Courts can determine
neither the reasonableness of the amortization period nor the constitu-
tionality of the law without evidence regarding the balancing of public
benefit and individual loss.92 When evidence of these competing inter-
ests exists, and when reasonable minds could differ on the outcome of
the balancing, the jury must determine whether the potential harm to
society outweighs and thus justifies the cost of the private injury.93
The protesting property owner has the burden of establishing that his
loss outweighs the public gain.94 The same test is used where the pro-
testing party is a lessee rather than a fee simple owner of property
which has been put to a nonconforming use.95
A factor that may affect the outcome of the balancing is the motive
or the justification for the termination provision. For example, a court
will be more likely to find a greater public benefit when the legislature
desires termination for reasons of safety rather than when it seeks ter-
(court could not impose on town board its judgment that benefit to public from removal
of billboards outweighed adverse effect on billboard owners).
92. Temple Baptist Church, Inc. v. City of Albuquerque, 98 N.M. 138, 646 P.2d
565 (1982) (without evidence bearing on balancing of public gain against individual loss,
court cannot determine whether amortization period is a reasonable and constitutional
alternative to just compensation).
93. See Plaza Health Clubs, Inc. v. City of New York, 76 A.D.2d 509, 430
N.Y.S.2d 815 (1980) (if plaintiffs had standing, reasonableness of amortization period
would present potential actionable issue); Modjeska Sign Studios v. Berle, 43 N.Y.2d
468, 373 N.E.2d 255, 402 N.Y.S.2d 359 (1977), appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 809 (1978)
(reasonableness of period is question of fact for trial).
94. "If an owner can show that the loss he suffers as a result of the removal of a
nonconforming use at the expiration of an amortization period is so substantial that it
outweighs the public benefit gained by the legislation, then the amortization period
must be held unreasonable." Modjeska Sign Studios, Inc. v. Berle, 43 N.Y.2d at 480,
373 N.E.2d at 262, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 367 (1977). See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San
Diego, 26 Cal. 3d 848, 610 P.2d 407, 164 Cal. Rptr. 510 (1980), rev'don other grounds,
453 U.S. 490 (1981) (owner of billboard has burden of proving the invalidity of an
amortization period contained in ordinance which prohibited its billboards). Cf Board
of Supervisors v. Miller, 170 N.W.2d 358 (Iowa 1969) (ordinance upheld as applied to
property owner who made no showing as to investments, value of improvements on
land, or extent of hardship in complying).
95. City of Seattle v. Martin, 54 Wash. 2d 541, 342 P.2d 602 (1959) (month-to-
month tenancy).
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nination for aesthetic purposes.96 Even though the immediate re-
moval of a billboard may sometimes be justified for safety reasons, in
the absence of compensation courts will require an amortization period
of between one year and ten years97 when the law is designed to serve
aesthetic needs.98 Although this "balancing" test may seem to be a
vague standard, it is very similar to the balancing test employed in
taking cases, or in cases involving the enjoining of a nuisance.99 Since
the balancing test lacks specificity and necessitates an examination of
the facts of each case,"co courts have sought a more defined standard.
In seeking to give substance to the balancing test, most courts have
employed the "investment theory."
A. Performing the Balancing: The "Investment Theory"
The "investment theory" holds an amortization provision valid if it
provides a reasonable period of time commensurate with the invest-
ment involved.'0 1 The period provided by the law is presumed reason-
able, and a protesting property owner has the burden of establishing
unreasonableness.' °2 "Reasonableness commensurate with the invest-
ment" does not necessarily mean that the statute must give the owner
enough time entirely to recoup his investment. At a minimum, how-
96. See Schropp, The Reasonableness of Aesthetic Zoning in Florida: A Look Be-
yond the Police Power, 10 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 441, 465 (1982).
97. The length of the amortization period may depend on the amount of investment
and other relevant factors.
98. See Art Neon Co. v. City & County of Denver, 488 F.2d 118 (10th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 932 (1974) (court upholds ordinance providing amortization pe-
riod of up to five years for general nonconforming signs but only a thirty-day removal
period for signs posing safety risk); Modjeska Sign Studios, Inc. v. Berle, 43 N.Y.2d
468, 373 N.E.2d 255, 402 N.Y.S.2d 359 (1977) (ordinance should require immediate
removal of billboard which poses a threat to safety of motorists, but one that merely
impairs aesthetics of community fails to provide compelling reason for immediate
removal).
99. See R. ELLICKsON & A.D. TARLOCK, LAND-UsE CoNTRoLs 196 (1981).
100. See Keller v. City of Council Bluffs, 246 Iowa 202, 208, 66 N.W.2d 113, 117
(1954).
101. See Livingston Rock & Gravel Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 43 Cal. 2d 121,
127, 272 P.2d 4, 8-9 (1954). See generally Note, A Suggested Means of Determining the
Proper Amortization Period for Nonconforming Structures, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1325, 1333
(1977) (noting that an amortization period allowing recovery of investment in a noncon-
forming structure is generally acceptable to the courts).
102. Castner v. City of Oakland, 129 Cal. App. 3d 94, 180 Cal. Rptr. 682 (1982);
United Business Comm'n v. City of San Diego, 91 Cal. App. 3d 156, 154 Cal. Rptr. 263
(1979).
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ever, the period must be long enough to prevent a substantial loss of
investment. 10 3 Thus, the owner may still suffer some monetary loss,
but the ordinance provides for a reasonable period within which to re-
cover most of his investment."4 Where a nonconforming structure is
involved, the test may include consideration of the estimated remaining
life of the building to be amortized. 05 Since the emphasis is always on
the monetary value of the nonconforming use, a more valuable use will
command a longer amortization period than a less valuable one. °0
One court has held that amortization is completely prohibited unless
the resulting loss to the owner is insubstantial compared with his total
investment.10 7 Another authority has suggested that when the invest-
ment in a nonconforming structure is so great that it would require an
amortization period of ten years or more, the amortization method is
inadequate because it fails to provide the prompt elimination that the
community needs.10" The majority view is that states can validly
amortize nonconforming uses by varying the amortization period ac-
cording to the owner's financial investment.
One commentator suggested"°9 that courts evaluate an investment's
value by looking chiefly to five factors: (1) initial cost of the use or
structure, (2) present depreciated value, (3) remaining useful life,
(4) existence of any lease or other obligations on the property, and
103. Modjeska Sign Studios, Inc. v. Berle, 43 N.Y.2d 468, 373 N.E.2d 255, 402
N.Y.S.2d 468 (1977). See Comment, The Abatement of Pre-existing Nonconforming
Uses Under Zoning Laws: Amortization, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 323, 332 (1962).
104. See Note, Amortization: A Means of Eliminating the Nonconforming Use in
Ohio, 19 CASE W. Rrs. L. REv. 1042, 1048-49 (1968) [hereinafter Note, Eliminating
the Nonconforming Use in Ohio].
105. See Graham, Legislative Techniques, supra note 20, at 450 (citing a Los Ange-
les, California, ordinance).
106. See id., citing a Fernandina, Florida, ordinance. See generally Note, Eliminat-
ing the Nonconforming Use in Ohio, supra note 104, at 1049.
107. See People v. Miller, 304 N.Y. 105, 106 N.E.2d 34 (1952) (preexisting use of
harboring pigeons on property could be terminated when loss to the property owner
would be insubstantial; hobby, rather than business, is not sufficient to give property
owner vested right in nonconforming use).
108. Norton, Elimination of Incompatible Uses and Structures, 20 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 305, 311 (1955) ("Fo wait a generation or two before eliminating or even
lessening the effect of an incompatible use is futile as a means of preventing the spread
of the infection of incompatibility, unless the incompatibility is more imaginary than
real.").
109. Schropp, The Reasonableness of Aesthetic Zoning in Florida, 10 FLA. ST. U.L.
REV. 441, 466 (1982), (citing Modjeska Sign Studios, Inc. v. Berle, 43 N.Y.2d 468, 373
N.E.2d 255, 402 N.Y.S.2d 468 (1977)).
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(5) realization of investment to date.11° It is difficult to determine the
monetary amount or length of time involved in each of these factors.
There is some authority that courts can use the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice depreciation methods in determining the economic value of im-
provements.111 This method fails to reflect the actual value remaining
at the time of the amortization. The mere fact that a structure has
been fully depreciated for tax purposes does not indicate that it is really
without value.112 Indeed, even recovery of the owner's original invest-
ment, with allowance for depreciation, is inadequate assurance that the
amortization period is reasonable, since other losses may occur as a
result of the forced termination. 113 Clearly, courts must recognize the
need to weigh all five factors in regard to the specific use or structure
under consideration.
It is also necessary to consider the harm that would result to the
public if courts permitted the use to remain beyond the prescribed
amortization period.114 When potential for this problem exists, a court
may conclude that the owner has no right to depreciate fully the value
of his property. Instead, a court should find that the owner is entitled
only to recover the cost of bringing his property into compliance with
the present zoning law." 5 In one instance, a city reclassified property
from commercial to residential and gave the owner twenty-five years in
which to continue the nonconforming commercial use. 116 The court
110. Id
111. National Advertising Co. v. County of Monterey, I Cal. 3d 875, 464 P.2d 33,
83 Cal. Rptr. 577 cerL denied, 398 U.S. 946 (1970). See Leonard, Amortization of Non-
Conforming Uses-What Are the Limits?, 45 TEX. B.J. 1485, 1489 (1982).
112. NationalAdvertising Co., 1 Cal. 3d at 887, 464 P.2d at 41, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 585,
(dissent of Sullivan, J.). "That a taxpayer's adjusted basis in property is zero hardly
means that such property is in fact without market value." See also Note, Zoning:
Amortization of Nonconforming Uses for Aesthetic Purposes, 39 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 179,
192-94 (1971).
113. See Graham, Legislative Techniques, supra note 20, at 449 (discussing such
factors as cost of relocation and character and age of nonconforming structures).
114. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 26 Cal. 3d 848, 884, 610 P.2d 407, 428,
164 Cal. Rptr. 510, 531 (1980), rev'd on other grounds, 453 U.S. 490 (1981). See City of
Los Angeles v. Gage, 127 Cal. App. 2d 442, 448-49, 274 P.2d 34, 37 (1954) (disturbance
caused by the use is to be considered).
115. See Harris v. Mayor & City Council, 35 Md. App. 572, 371 A.2d 706 (1977)
(upholding ordinance that established minimum lot size per dwelling unit and required
plaintiff-owners to reduce number of dwellings in multiple-family structures to comply
with the lot size; 15-year period of amortization).
116. City of University Park v. Benners, 485 S.W.2d 773 (Tex. 1972), see supra note
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held the amortization reasonable because the property owner had suffi-
cient time in which to recoup any loss in property value occasioned by
the reclassification. 117 The court emphasized that the reasonableness
of the opportunity for recoupment must be measured according to con-
ditions existing when the use is declared nonconforming, rather than
by conditions as they exist at the end of the tolerance period.'18
A court will almost certainly uphold an amortization ordinance if all
factors indicate that the prescribed period is adequate for recovery of a
substantial part of the investment. When the owners of nonconforming
billboards had fully recouped their original investment, substantially
depreciated their billboards for income tax purposes, and would, under
lease and license obligations, incur no substantial economic losses, a
court held the period reasonable.' 19 In addition, when an ordinance
allowed a check-cashing agency to take five years to remove its busi-
ness from a district and fully to depreciate its investment, a court held
the amortization law valid. 120
In less clear cases, courts must weigh the five factors previously dis-
cussed to determine whether, under the circumstances, the period is
reasonable. Disputes often center on particular elements of monetary
loss and on whether the amortization period is sufficient to allow recov-
ery. Courts will also consider expenditures for improvements to the
property when determining the reasonableness of the amortization pe-
riod."'2 This is qualified, however, by the general rule that once a stat-
ute renders a use nonconforming, the property owner cannot ordinarily
expand or substantially alter the use, but can only engage in basic re-
pair and maintenance. The investment that the owner is allowed to
117. 485 S.W.2d 773 (Tex. 1972).
118. Id at 779. See generally Katarincic, Elimination of Non-conforming Uses,
Buildings, and Structures by Amortization-Concept versus Law, 2 DUQUESNE L. REv.
1(1963).
119. Suffolk Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Town of Southampton, 88 A.D.2d 601,
449 N.Y.S.2d 766, appeal dismissed, 57 N.Y.2d 1047, 444 N.E.2d 38, 457 N.Y.S.2d 788
(1982), aff'd, 60 N.Y.2d 70, 455 N.E.2d 1245, 468 N.Y.S.2d 450 (1983). See generally
Note, A Suggested Means of Determining the Proper Amortization Period for Noncon-
forming Structures, 27 STAN. L. REv. 1325, 1335-36 (1977) (legislation should set
amortization period to require termination of a nonconforming structure when the orig-
inal investment is fully returned).
120. Eutaw Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Baltimore, 241 Md. 686, 217 A.2d 348
(1966).
121. See Board of Supervisors v. Miller, 170 N.W.2d 358, 364 (1969) (courts evalu-
ating the validity of an amortization period can consider expenditures though they are
not necessarily determinative).
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recover during the amortization period must be limited accordingly. 122
Similarly, since there is no right to replace a nonconforming use with
another use of the same kind, the replacement cost of the property is
irrelevant and should be disregarded in determining the reasonableness
of the amortization period.123
One general rule that overrides other considerations is that the prop-
erty owner has no right to recover losses caused by his own fault. For
example, the state granted a lessee a three-year grace period after
which he was to terminate his nonconforming use. The court held that
the lessee had no right to recover money he invested in an additional
long-term lease, nor for improvements that he continued to make on
the premises following the effective date of the amortization
ordinance. 1
24
Another generally accepted rule is that the owner of a terminated
nonconforming use is not entitled to recover his moving expenses, even
if they are substantial.12 5 A court refused to allow the owner of an
automobile junkyard to recover the cost of removing the junk
automobiles. Moreover, the court rejected the junkyard owner's con-
tention that the resulting hardship of moving the cars at his own ex-
pense justified his continuation of the nonconforming use. 126 The rule
against considering expenses of removal is strengthened when the value
of the nonconforming use has largely been extinguished by the end of
122. See Newman Signs, Inc. v. Hjelle, 268 N.W.2d 741 (N.D. 1978), appeal dis-
missed, 440 U.S. 901 (1979) (interpreting North Dakota Highway Beautification Act; to
construe statute to compensate sign owner according to value of sign after it had been
expanded, reconstructed, or substantially altered would be to violate standard of "rea-
sonable damages").
123. Art Neon Co. v. City & County of Denver, 488 F.2d 118, 122 (10th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 932 (1974) (portion of ordinance providing different periods of
amortization for signs having different replacement costs was unreasonable since re-
placement cost presents no valid basis for different treatment).
124. State v. Joyner, 286 N.C. 366, 211 S.E.2d 320, appeal dismissed, 422 U.S. 1002
(1975).
125. See Shifflett v. Baltimore County, 247 Md. 151, 230 A.2d 310 (1967) (fact that
moving businesses might entail substantial expenses is not controlling in determining
validity of an ordinance requiring termination). But see Graham, Legislative Tech-
niques, supra note 20, at 449, discussing some authorities in which cost of relocation has
been mentioned as a possible factor in determining the reasonableness of the amortiza-
tion period. Cf Harbison v. City of Buffalo, 4 N.Y.2d 553, 563-64, 152 N.E.2d 42, 47,
176 N.Y.S.2d 598, 606 (1958) (listing cost of relocation as a factor bearing on the rea-
sonableness of amortization provisions).
126. Town of Schroeppel v. Spector, 43 Misc. 2d 290, 251 N.Y.S.2d 233 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1963).
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the grace period, and therefore, moving the use is impractical. 127
A court will always find an amortization period valid if there is no
evidence of economic harm,12 or if the property owner fails to show
some loss due to the termination. 29 In contrast, a court will hold the
amortization provision invalid if the property owner shows both a re-
sulting financial loss and a lack of public benefit from the law's applica-
tion.1 30  Between these extremes, a court must determine the
reasonableness of the period upon a consideration of the relevant ele-
ments of investment in each individual case.
B. The Balancing of Noninvestment Factors
Since a use can often be more readily moved to another location,
courts generally provide a shorter amortization period for a noncon-
forming use than for a nonconforming structure. 131 When a use is in-
127. See Naegele Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Village of Minnetonka, 281 Minn.
492, 162 N.W.2d 206 (1968) (failure to compensate for removal of billboards did not
render ordinance unconstitutional when value of billboards would either be extin-
guished before or at end of grace period, or by virtue of monopoly, would equal their
increased worth enjoyed during period of amortization).
In determining that an amortization provision is reasonable, a court may, however,
bolster its conclusion by stating that moving to another location was feasible but that no
evidence of moving costs was shown. See People v. Gates, 41 Cal. App. 3d 590, 116
Cal. Rptr. 172 (1974) (owners of nonconforming auto-wrecking yard could move opera-
tion within 18 months and had failed to present any evidence of moving expenses);
Shifflett v. Baltimore County, 247 Md. 151, 230 A.2d 310 (1967) (plaintiff owners of
junkyards failed to show that they were unable to obtain other land for that purpose).
Cf Harbison v. City of Buffalo, 4 N.Y.2d 553, 562, 152 N.E.2d 42, 47, 176 N.Y.S.2d
598, 605 (1958) (if courts prohibited amortization laws, the owner of a business or other
use could utilize the land for that purpose in perpetuity, despite changes in neighbor-
hood and despite ready transferability of the use to another site).
128. See Northend Cinema, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 90 Wash. 2d 709, 585 P.2d 1153
(1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 946 (1979) (upholding an ordinance requiring that adult
motion picture theaters be located only in certain downtown areas and terminating all
nonconforming theater uses within 90 days).
129. See Board of Supervisors v. Miller, 170 N.W.2d 358 (Iowa 1969) (protesting
property owner made no showing of business investments, value of improvements on
land, or extent of hardship in complying with the ordinance).
130. See Village of Oak Park v. Gordon, 32 IlI. 2d 295, 205 N.E.2d 464 (1965)
(undisputed that owner of rooming house would suffer financial loss if required to com-
ply with amortization ordinance; no evidence that public interest would be served). Cf
Town of Hempstead v. Romano, 33 Misc. 2d 315, 226 N.Y.S.2d 291 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1962) (court would not enforce zoning ordinance against nonconforming junkyard and
automobile-wrecking business when owners would suffer financial loss and the munici-
pality had failed to act for more than 18 years on its alleged right to terminate the use).
131. See Village of Gurnee v. Miller, 69 Ill. App. 2d 248, 215 N.E.2d 829 (1966);
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volved, the nature of that use may, along with the above-mentioned
"investment factors," affect the validity of the prescribed amortization
period.13 2 In some cases, the use may justify a shorter period than
would otherwise be permissible, such as when the use constitutes a nui-
sance. A court can even order the immediate termination of a nuisance
when necessary to protect the public safety, health or general wel-
fare.1 33 Furthermore, courts may also uphold short amortization peri-
ods for nonconforming uses with near-nuisance characteristics.13 4
There are other factors that cast doubts on the validity of amortiza-
tion provisions or that require a longer grace period. For instance,
amortization without compensation may be unconstitutional when the
nonconforming use is the only practical use for the property in ques-
tion. 135 In such cases, there is a strong argument that since amortiza-
tion of the nonconforming use would leave the property unusable for
Modjeska Sign Studios, Inc. v. Berle, 43 N.Y.2d 468, 373 N.E.2d 255, 402 N.Y.S.2d 359
(1977), appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 809 (1978).
132. See Spurgeon v. Board of Comm'rs, 181 Kan. 1008, 317 P.2d 798 (1957) (auto-
mobile-wrecking business); Wolf v. City of Omaha, 177 Neb. 545, 129 N.W.2d 501
(1964) (dog kennel in residential neighborhood); White v. City of Dallas, 517 S.W.2d
344 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974) (automobile-wrecking yard in residential district). See gener-
ally 82 AM. JUR. 2d Zoning and Planning § 189, at 703-04 (1964) (observing that some
courts place "particular importance on the relationship between the length of the amor-
tization period and the nature of the nonconforming use. On the public benefit side of
the scale, the degree of offensiveness of the nonconforming use, in view of the surround-
ing neighborhood's character, has often been significant").
133. See Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (ordinance prohibiting brick-
yards in residential area held valid as applied to existing brickyard); Reinman v. City of
Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915) (regulation against stables applied to preexisting stable
in business area). Cf Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (regulation
upheld though it rendered continued operation of preexisting quarry nearly impossible);
People v. Miller, 304 N.Y. 105, 106 N.E.2d 34 (1952) (ordinance forbidding the keeping
of pigeons in residential area validly applied to preexisting use). See generally D.
HAGMAN & J. JUERGENSMEYER, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CON-
TROL LAW § 4.36, at 127-29 ("Immediate Termination of Nuisance") (1986). In order
for a court to justify immediate termination, the nuisance usually must amount to a
public, not merely a private, nuisance. In other words, the use in question will have to
involve a violation of some criminal law and an interference with a public right, or at
least with a substantial number of people. See Reynolds, Public Nuisance: A Crime in
Tort Law, 31 OKLA. L. REv. 318 (1978). See generally Prosser, Private Action for Pub-
lic Nuisance, 52 VA. L. REV. 997 (1966).
134. McKinney v. Riley, 105 N.H. 249, 197 A.2d 218 (1964) (court gave owner of
automobile junkyard only one year to terminate that use due to possible public and
private nuisance).
135. See Town of Surry v. Starkey, 115 N.H. 31, 332 A.2d 172 (1975) (court held
unreasonable an ordinance that prohibited property owner from using land within 200
feet of highway centerline for gravel bank and that barred owner from removing part of
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any reasonably profitable activity, there would be a taking without just
compensation. Local governments must therefore use less drastic al-
ternatives, such as limiting, rather than terminating, the nonconform-
ing use.' 36 Cases in which the only reasonable use for the property is
nonconforming are rare. Furthermore, the suitability of the particular
piece of land for various possible uses is not the controlling issue.
Rather, the key factor in determining the ordinance's validity is the
best interest of the entire zoning district. 137
A more common problem with imposing an amortization period is
the nonconforming use that involves an exercise of freedom of speech,
such as a motion picture theater or a billboard. Even if the law of a
particular state clearly permits amortization of nonconforming uses,
courts should strictly scrutinize such ordinances to determine whether
they affect first amendment rights.
One example is the now-popular "spacing" ordinances applied to
adult theaters. 3 Many such ordinances contain grandfather clauses
its top soil or subsoil as applied to land that could not be used except for gravel
removal).
136. Id. The Starkey court suggested that public health and safety could be pro-
tected by enactments setting standards for issuance of permits for continued removal of
gravel or specifying limits for expansion. Cf. Bither v. Baker Rock Crushing Co., 249
Or. 640, 440 P.2d 368 (1968) (court would enjoin only rock quarrying or crushing activ-
ities constituting an increase of volume or level that existed at time of adoption of in-
terim zoning law).
137. See City of Los Angeles v. Gage, 127 Cal. App. 2d 442, 452, 274 P.2d 34, 40
(1954) (citing Reynolds v. Barrett, 12 Cal. 2d 244, 83 P.2d 29 (1938)).
138. See Ellwest Stereo Theaters Inc. v. Byrd, 472 F. Supp. 702 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
Many local legislatures have passed these ordinances in the wake of Young v. American
Mini-Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976). Young upheld, against first and fourteenth amend-
ment attacks, ordinances prohibiting operation of any "adult" movie theater, bookstore,
etc., within 1,000 feet of any other such establishment, or within 500 feet of a residential
area. See generally Annot., Validity of "War Zone" Ordinances Restricting Location of
Sex-Oriented Businesses, 1 A.L.R.4th 1297 (1980). Subsequently, the U.S. Supreme
Court also upheld an ordinance that, instead of dispensing "adult" uses as in Young,
concentrated such uses in certain limited areas. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres,
Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986). Some courts, however, have invalidated spacing restrictions
on grounds of vagueness. See Harris Books, Inc. v. City of Santa Fe, 98 N.M. 235, 647
P.2d 868 (1982) (ordinance forbidding location of adult bookstores within 1,000 feet of
residential area unconstitutionally vague where "residential area" not defined); or on
grounds of improper delegation of governmental power, see Larkin v. Grendel's Den,
Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982) (statute vesting in the governing bodies of churches and
schools the power to veto liquor licenses within 500-foot radius of the church or school
delegates governmental power to private entities and violates establishment clause of
first amendment). See generally Pearlman, Zoning and the First Amendment, 16 URB.
LAW. 217 (1984).
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that allow the continuation of nonconforming uses. 13 9 When legisla-
tion provides for amortization, courts may invalidate the ordinance as
an excessive restriction on public access to protected speech."4 If the
protesting party fails to meet his burden of showing that the ordinance
is unreasonable in light of the free-speech interests involved, courts will
uphold amortization. 14'
In Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego,42 the Supreme Court rec-
ognized that legislatures may impose reasonable "time, place, and
manner" restrictions on speech and may even be quite severe concern-
ing commercial speech, although the Court there invalidated as dis-
criminatory an ordinance that permitted certain noncommercial
messages while prohibiting others. In dealing with the problem of non-
conforming signs, courts are reluctant to uphold termination provi-
sions and often find "vested rights" in signs that owners have already
erected.' 43 If the usual standard of reasonableness is met, states can
require amortization of billboards and other signs so long as the law is
substantially related to the public health, safety, morals, or general
welfare."4 Noting that signs, like other property, are owned subject to
139. See Genusa v. City of Peoria, 619 F.2d 1203, 1212 n.18 (7th Cir. 1980); Bay-
side Enterprises, Inc. v. Carson, 450 F. Supp. 696, 702 n.9 (M.D. Fla. 1978) (both cases
dealt with ordinances containing grandfather clauses).
140. Purple Onion, Inc. v. Jackson, 511 F. Supp. 1207 (N.D. Ga. 1981); E & B
Enterprises v. City of University Park, 449 F. Supp. 695 (N.D. Tex. 1977). Cf. Bayside
Enterprises, 450 F. Supp. at 696 (court struck down a restriction on adult bookstores
and movie houses as unduly severe despite its "grandfather clause").
141. See Castner v. City of Oakland, 129 Cal. App. 3d 94, 180 Cal. Rptr. 682
(1982).
142. 453 U.S. 490 (1981). In Metromedia the U.S. Supreme Court refrained from
addressing the problem of nonconforming signs. The Court remanded the case to the
California Supreme Court. The California Supreme Court noted that the U.S. Supreme
Court had found that the ordinance violated the first amendment because it prohibited
noncommercial billboards. Therefore, the court ruled that it was impossible to construe
the ordinance as constitutional. The court held that limiting the ordinance's scope to
prohibit only commercial signs would be clearly contrary to the language of the law and
the intent of its drafters. Moreover, such limitation would invite constitutional difficul-
ties with respect to distinguishing between commercial and noncommercial signs. Me-
tromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 32 Cal. 3d 180, P.2d 902, 185 Cal. Rptr. 260, 649
(1982). For a discussion of this case's earlier history in the California courts, see notes
78, 91 and 110 supra and accompanying text.
143. See Stoner McCray Sys. v. City of Des Moines, 247 Iowa 1313, 78 N.W.2d 842
(1956).
144. See Elliott Advertising Co. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 425 F.2d 1141 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 805 (1970); Mayor & Council of New Castle v. Rollins
Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 475 A.2d 355 (Del. Supr. 1984); Inhabitants of Town of
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the exercise of the state's police power, the New Mexico Supreme
Court upheld a law requiring owners of billboards to remove the signs
at their own expense. 45
Courts may also consider the location of the use when determining
the validity of an amortization ordinance. Indeed, both the nature of
the neighborhood surrounding the use and the proximity of an area to
which the property owner could relocate are criteria to apply in deter-
mining the reasonableness of an amortization ordinance.1 46 The offen-
siveness of the nonconforming use with respect to its surroundings has
been of particular importance in evaluating the public benefit which a
community seeks to achieve by the termination.147 In considering this
location factor, courts may draw on precedents from nuisance law. In
nuisance law, location of the offending structure or use has always been
of great significance. 14' A court is much more likely to uphold the
application of an amortization provision to a developed area in which
the nonconforming use is clearly inappropriate than to an undeveloped
area or to any area with an unsettled character.149 After all, it is the
Boothbay v. National Advertising Co., 347 A.2d 419 (Me. Supr. 1975); Beals v. County
of Douglas, 93 Nev. 156, 560 P.2d 1373 (1977); Markham Advertising Co. v. State, 73
Wash. 2d 405, 439 P.2d 248 (1968), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 316, reh'g denied, 393
U.S. 1112 (1969).
145. National Advertising Co. v. State ex reL State Highway Comm'n, 91 N.M.
191, 571 P.2d 1194 (1977) (where sign permits stated that permits could be revoked at
any time, removal of signs pursuant to State Highway Beautification Act was not un-
constitutional and sign owners not entitled to compensation).
146. Harbison v. City of Buffalo, 4 N.Y.2d 553, 563-64, 176, 152 N.E.2d 42, 47
NY.S.2d 598, 606 (1958). See Graham, Legislative Techniques, supra note 20, at 449.
147. See Grant v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 212 Md. 301, 129 A.2d 363
(1957) (upholding amortization provision as to billboards in residential areas, court
points out that the billboards irritated inhabitants of those areas and contributed to
depreciation of property values); Lachapelle v. Goffstown, 107 N.H. 485, 225 A.2d 624
(1967) (amortization upheld on automobile junkyard directly across from college
campus).
148. See Mandelker, Prolonging the Nonconforming Use: Judicial Restriction of the
Power to Zone in Iowa, 8 Dr L. REv. 23, 28-30 (1958) (noting that the Iowa court
sometimes engaged in "zoning judicially in the guise of nuisance doctrine"). On the use
of nuisance law as a land-use device, see generally Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning:
Covenants, Nuisance Rules and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHi. L. Rnv. 681,
719-24 (1973); Note, Land Use and Environmental Policy: Litigation of Nuisances as a
Land Use Contro The Spur Industries Case, 26 OKLA. L. Rnv. 583 (1973). On public
nuisance, see generally Reynolds, Public Nuisance: A Crime in Tort Law, 31 OKLA. L.
Rlv. 318 (1978).
149. See National Advertising Co. v. County of Monterey, 211 Cal. App. 2d 375, 27
Cal. Rptr. 136 (1962) (amortization ordinance upheld as to developed areas, but struck
down as applied to areas in which the character of development was unclear).
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inappropriateness of the particular use to the particular area that justi-
fies declaring the use "nonconforming." Thus, if the property owner
can show that his use is appropriate to its location, or that his use has
its greatest value in its present location, a strong case may be made for
the unreasonableness of the amortization law. This burden of proof,
however, is usually difficult to establish. 5 The primary purpose of
zoning is to achieve orderly physical development of the community by
confining specific kinds of structures and uses to certain areas. There-
fore, nonconforming uses are at best tolerated, and should be elimi-
nated whenever equitably possible. 5'
In particular cases, other noninvestment factors may also help deter-
mine the validity of amortization ordinances. For instance, if a munici-
pality fails to exercise its power to terminate a nonconforming use for a
long period of time, a court, applying principles of equity, may refuse
to order termination of the use. This is particularly true if the munici-
pality's delay in enforcement causes the owner increased loss from the
termination.' 52 Although courts generally reject the cost of relocation
as a relevant factor,' 53 courts sometimes mention it as an additional
consideration, along with the feasibility of the business or use being
continued in another location.' 54 Any amortization plan should ide-
150. See National Advertising Co. v. County of Monterey, 1 Cal. 3d 875, 464 P.2d
33, 83 Cal. Rptr. 577, cert. denied, 398 U.S. 946 (1970) (plaintiff billboard company
failed to sustain burden of showing that its signs had value only in their particular
location and for their particular use).
151. Hay v. Board of Adjustment of Fort Lee, 37 N.J. Super. 461, 117 A.2d 650
(1955) (enlargement of nonconforming service station prohibited).
152. See Town of Hempstead v. Romano, 33 Misc. 2d 315, 226 N.Y.S.2d 291 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1962) (court denied amortization when municipality failed to act for more than
18 years on its alleged right to terminate nonconforming junkyard and automobile-
wrecking business and owners had made substantial investments in the business during
that period).
153. See supra notes 125-127 and accompanying text.
154. See Harbison v. City of Buffalo, 4 N.Y.2d 553, 152 N.E.2d 42, 176 N.Y.S.2d
598 (1958) (indicating that courts considering appropriate damages should consider the
proximity of the nearest area to which the nonconforming use might relocate, the cost
of such relocation, and any other reasonable costs bearing on the amount of damages).
Of course, whenever any use is relocated, it ordinarily must comply with the zoning
for the new location unless a variance is obtained through a showing of unnecessary
hardship. See Farr v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 139 Conn. 577, 95 A.2d 792 (1953) (find-
ing insufficient showing of hardship, court denied variance to package liquor store seek-
ing to transfer to a new location where it would be nonconforming use). See generally
Arnebergh, Variances in Zoning, 24 U. KAN. Crry L. REv. 240 (1956); Comment,
Variance Law in New York- An Examination and Proposal, 44 ALBANY L. REV. 781
(1980); Note, Zoning Variances, 74 HARv. L. Rnv. 1396 (1961). On the "unnecessary
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ally consider these surrounding circumstances, though some factors,
such as cost of relocation and amount of investment, are only of mini-
mal importance. 15
5
C. The Need for More Successful Use of Amortization
Despite the recent popularity of amortization provisions and the
general acceptance of their validity, such laws have been largely unsuc-
cessful in eliminating nonconforming uses. A study by the American
Society of Planning Officials in 1971 indicated that while 159 of the 489
cities and counties surveyed had amortization provisions in their zon-
ing laws, only 27 localities had actually employed such provisions to
terminate the existence of buildings or other structures.156 Cities pri-
marily used amortization against billboards or other uses involving rel-
atively small amounts of investment. Furthermore, most zoning
administrators were dissatisfied with amortization as a means of elimi-
nating undesirable uses from the community. 157
Some authorities believe that amortization is not the final solution to
the problem of nonconforming uses, particularly in light of the numer-
ous factors that legislatures and courts must weigh in determining a
reasonable amortization period.15' Nonetheless, there is a continuing
trend toward finding valid amortization provisions that are reasonable
in light of all surrounding circumstances.' 59
No single time period can be valid for all amortized buildings or
uses. Therefore, amortization provisions must be flexible. Some com-
hardship" standard that courts commonly employ in determining whether a variance is
justified, see Note, Zoning Variances: The "Unnecessary Hardship" Rule, 8 SYRACUSE
L. REv. 85 (1956). For a critical study of the work of boards of adjustment, which are
usually empowered to grant or deny variances, see Dukeminier & Stapleton, The Zon-
ing Board of Adjustment: A Case Study in Misrule, 50 KY. L.J. 273 (1962).
155. See Graham, Legislative Techniques, supra note 20, at 449.
156. Scott, The Effect of Nonconforming Land-Use Amortization, Planning Advisory
Service Report No. 280 (May 1972), quoted in R. WRIGHT & M. GrrELMAN, LAND USE
779 (3d ed. 1982).
157. Id
158. See Note, Termination of Nonconforming Uses--Harbison to the Present, 14
SYRACUSE L. REV. 62, 69-70 (1962). See also Comment, Zoning-Principle of Retroac-
tivity and Amortization of the Non-Conforming Use-A Paradox in Property Law, 4
VILL. L. REV. 416, 428 (1959) (suggesting that courts should reverse the normal pre-
sumption of validity of legislative enactments, including zoning laws, in the case of
amortization ordinances in order to protect a nonconforming owner's rights to due
process).
159. See Graham, Legislative Techniques, supra note 20, at 451-52.
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mentators suggest that this flexibility could be achieved by an adminis-
trative process in which amortization periods are determined by a
board of experts." ° Legislation could set forth the factors that the
board would weigh, and there would be a hearing at which the prop-
erty owner could present his side of the case.' A California county
used a similar method in evaluating an ordinance which authorized the
board of supervisors to order the termination of a nonconforming use
within a specified period.'62 As the California ordinance demonstrates,
the legislation need not create a new administrative body in order for
this approach to work. The state could delegate the power to establish
amortization periods to existing governing bodies, such as a city coun-
cil or county board of commissioners. The state could also delegate the
power to a body such as the zoning or planning commission, or the
board of zoning appeals, which handles other specific zoning problems,
such as requests for variances or special use permits.
Much of the litigation over amortization has arisen from the ten-
dency of zoning authorities to set an inequitable time period for the
termination of nonconforming uses. 163 This tendency clearly contra-
dicts repeated judicial statements that the validity of amortization or-
ders must be determined on a case-by-case basis in which legislators
consider the amount of investment and other relevant factors in the
particular situation.
The suggested administrative approach would avoid many of the
problems inherent in purely legislative methods. Particularly, under
the legislative method, the termination period must be long enough to
accommodate the most valuable and durable use to which the amorti-
zation law might be applied. Otherwise, the most valuable uses would
160. Note, Eliminating the Nonconforming Use in Ohio, supra note 104, at 1057-58.
See also Note, A Suggested Means of Determining the Proper Amortization Period for
Nonconforming Structures, 27 STAN. L. REv. 1325, 1336 (1977) (advocating the use of a
zoning commission "or similar administrative agency" to establish amortization
periods).
161. Note, Eliminating the Nonconforming Use in Ohio, supra note 104, at 1058.
162. People v. Gates, 41 Cal. App. 3d 590, 116 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1974). When, as it
did in this case, the governing body delegates power to an administrative agency, such
as a zoning board, the limits of delegation must be considered. Generally, the governing
body must set the basic legislative policy. Subsequently, the administrators can supply
the details within the basic guidelines. See generally Note, Delegation of Legislative
Power by Municipal Corporations, 8 VA. L. PV. 450 (1922); 0. REYNOLDS, LOCAL
GovERNMENT LAW 160-70 (1982).
163. Leonard, Amortization of Nonconforming Uses-What Are the Limits?, 45
TEX. B.J. 1485, 1489 (1982).
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escape termination on the ground that the ordinance was unreasonable
as applied to them."' The administrative approach avoids this prob-
lem. Of course, the administrative method might be subject to a legis-
latively established maximum period of amortization. Within such
limits, the legislature may vest discretion in the administrative body to
determine the appropriate amortization period according to the use
and investment involved, as well as to the degree of incompatibility of
the particular use to its zoning district.' 6 5 The administrative ap-
proach also creates the possibility that some nonconforming uses, if not
overly noxious in nature, could remain in their present locations if they
met certain "performance standards" regarding their potentially both-
ersome characteristics. "'
IV. CONCLUSION
Basic zoning law presents an "either-or" situation, in which a forbid-
den use is either totally barred from a district or, if it qualifies as "non-
conforming," is allowed to remain forever. Amortization has
introduced much-needed flexibility into this system by providing cities
the opportunity to terminate nonconforming uses after a reasonable pe-
riod. Since they provide a single time period applicable to all uses and
structures, amortization provisions are inherently rigid. Furthermore,
such provisions disregard consideration of such factors as the amount
of investment and the nature of the use that courts have required to be
weighed if the amortization ordinance is to pass constitutional muster.
The prescribed period of amortization must be flexible to accommo-
date adequately the relevant factors of each case. States can best
achieve this goal through administrative bodies similar to those em-
ployed in other areas of zoning practice. 167 This system would allow
the public need to eliminate uses that interfere with orderly community
164. See Graham, Legislative Techniques, supra note 20, at 450.
165. Id at 451. See generally Anderson, The Nonconforming Use-A Product of
Euclidean Zoning, 10 SYRACUSE L. REv. 214, 240 (1959) (noting that amortization
may apply fairly to some uses and unjustly to others, Anderson advocates greater use of
eminent domain). Political and financial considerations, however, have led most com-
mentators to reject this idea. See Note, Nonconforming Uses: A Rationale and an Ap-
proach, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 91, 93 (1953).
166. As suggested in Horack, Performance Standards in Residential Zoning, in
AMERICAN SoC'Y OF PLANNING OFFICIALS, PLANNING 1952, at 153 (Proceedings of
Nat'l Conference 1952); Mandelker, Prolonging the Nonconforming Use: Judicial Re-
striction of the Power to Zone in Iowa, 8 DRAKE L. REv. 23, 35 (1958).
167. See generally 0. REYNOLDS, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 404-14 (1982).
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planning to be balanced against the individual need for assurance that a
use, lawful when established, cannot be eliminated unless the state
gives the owner adequate opportunity to recoup his investment. Zon-
ing laws are responsible for the problems associated with the treatment
of nonconforming uses. Therefore, zoning law can and should solve
the problem16 by providing an equitable balancing of public benefit
and private loss.
168. See Grant v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 212 Md. 301, 308, 129 A.2d
363, 366 (1957) (stating that it is apparent that if state and local governments are to
handle nonconforming uses effectively, they must address the problem under the law of
zoning, as opposed, in particular, to the law of nuisance).
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